[ARI Working Paper Seires No. 10]



China's "Public Diplomacy": A Useful Smart Power



by Ming Lee

(Professor, National Chengchi University)

Notes on Contributor

Ming Lee is currently Professor of Department of Diplomacy at the National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taipei, Taiwan. Professor Lee received his doctorate degree from the University of Virginia (UVA), Charlottesville, Virginia, majoring in foreign affairs. Before transferring to the UVA, he studied at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University from 1982-84. After his returning to Taipei in 1988, Dr. Lee first worked at the Institute of International Relations (IIR) of the NCCU as an Associate Research Fellow, then he became the Section Chief of the Cooperation and Exchange Program of the IIR. In August 1992, Dr. Lee was recruited into the Department of Diplomacy of the same University. Dr. Lee has become full professor since August 1998. Professor Lee was Chairperson of the Department of Diplomacy from August 2003 to July 2007. Professor Lee’s interests cover the Northeast Asian international relations, American foreign policy, Mainland Chinese affairs, international relations, international conflict and crisis management.

------------------------------

Abstract

The term of “public diplomacy” was first used in 1965 by Dean Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, when he described “public diplomacy” as a method or means dealing with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. Another definition, according to him, would be that— “Central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of information and ideas.” Although China did not use the same terminology until lately, Beijing has in fact operated the tactics, or essence, of public diplomacy before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over the Chinese mainland, i.e., the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Public diplomacy to China has been paralleled to “United Front” tactics for consolidating the CCP’s bastion through propaganda. The purpose of propaganda is further targeted to woo citizens, to stir their hatred against the capitalist class and the imperialists, and finally unite people to overthrow the Kuomintang (KMT) government. The CCP took advantage of whispers, newspapers, intelligentsia, foreign correspondents, for international understanding and support during the anti-Japanese war. They helped the CCP in winning support in local and overseas campaigns. When

the CCP won in the civil war, the PRC began to dominate mass media, for it knew how mighty they were.



After long period of international isolation when China entered into the Korean War, China began to apply the public diplomacy in order to remedy its tarnished global image. Mao Zedong received American journalist Edgar Snow, mourned the Canadian doctor Henry N. Bethune, who sacrificed in Yenan, announced the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” and launched the “ping-pong diplomacy” as well as “panda

diplomacy,” and won a tremendous victory.



China’s idea of “public diplomacy” resemblances Joseph Nye’s “soft power,” or “smart power,” with which China could improve its relations with others, or eliminating adverse descriptions about China. Ever since China’s adoption of “Open and Reform Policy,” China’s targets have been focused on helping safeguard China’s road to modernization. China’s efforts have been to defend its ascendance and convince others that

it hurts no one, there is no “China threat” while China become stronger and wealthier. In addition, the PRC acts like Beijing protects Chinese culture, a contradictory memory compared with Cultural Revolution, and rational participator in international affairs. This paper tries to interpret how China perceives the value of public diplomacy, and to see how the PRC applies it, and finally tries to scale its impact in China’s foreign policy.